



Barely a quarter century after the collapse of the Soviet empire, democracy has 
entered an intense period of public scrutiny. The election of President Donald Trump 
and the Brexit vote are dramatic moments in a populist uprising against the post-
war political consensus of liberal rule. But they are also signposts in a process long 
in the making, yet perhaps not fully appreciated until the intense electoral upheavals 
of recent years. The current moment is defined by distrust of the institutional order 
of democracy and, more fundamentally, of the idea that there is a tomorrow and 
that the losers of today may unseat the victors in a new round of electoral challenge. 
At issue across the nuances of the national settings is a deep challenge to the core 
claim of democracy to be the superior form of political organization of civilized 
peoples. 
The current democratic malaise is rooted not so much in the outcome of any 
particular election but in four central institutional challenges, each one a compro-
mise of how democracy was consolidated over the past few centuries. The four are: 
first, the accelerated decline of political parties and other institutional forms of pop-
ular engagement; second, the paralysis of the legislative branches; third, the loss of 
a sense of social cohesion; and fourth, the decline in state competence. While there 
are no doubt other candidates for inducing anxiety over the state of democracy, these 
four have a particular salience in theories of democratic superiority that make their 
decline or loss a matter of grave concern. Among the great defenses of democracy 
stand the claims that democracies offer the superior form of participation, of delib-
eration, of solidarity, and of the capacity to get the job done. We need not arbitrate 
among the theories of participatory democracy, deliberative democracy, solidaristic 
democracy, or epistemic democratic superiority. Rather, we should note with concern 
that each of these theories states a claim for the advantages of democracy, and each 
faces worrisome disrepair. 
INTRODUCTION 
History confounds certainty. Barely a quarter century after 
the collapse of the Soviet empire, it is democracy that has entered 
an intense period of public scrutiny. The election of President 
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Donald Trump and the Brexit vote are dramatic moments in a 
populist uprising against the postwar political consensus of lib-
eral rule. But they are also signposts in a process long in the mak-
ing, yet perhaps not fully appreciated until the intense electoral 
upheavals of recent years. A percentage or two change in the 
Brexit vote, or a few tens of thousands of votes cast differently in 
a few key US states, would certainly have postponed the confron-
tation but would not have altered the fundamental concerns. 
With the realignment of the Dutch and French elections, the 
emergence of a hard-right populism in Hungary and Poland, and 
the mushrooming of antigovernance alliances in Italy and Spain, 
deeper questions must be asked about the state of democracy. 
Italy may have had forty-four governments in a fifty-year span, 
but power generally rotated among a familiar array of parties, 
personalities, and policies—until former Prime Minister Silvio 
Berlusconi reoriented politics and the current nihilist trends 
emerged. 
Today’s moment is defined by the distrust of two key features 
of democratic governance: the centrality of institutional order and 
the commitment to what in game theory would be termed “repeat 
play,” the idea that there is a tomorrow and that the losers of to-
day may unseat the victors in a new round of electoral challenge. 
The central idea of contestation, of losers and winners engaged 
in common enterprise, is ceding to what Professor Jan-Werner 
Müller refers to as a “permanent campaign”1 aiming to “prepare 
the people for nothing less than what is conjured up as a kind of 
apocalyptic confrontation.”2 In rejection of any pluralist account 
of democracy, “[t]here can be no populism . . . without someone 
speaking in the name of the people as a whole.”3 Populist impulses 
shorten the time frame and turn everything into a binary choice, 
a political life at the knife’s edge. Us or them, success or perfidy, 
the people or the oligarchs, Americans or foreigners. There can be 
no spirit of partial victory, of legitimate disagreement, or even of 
mutual gain through engagement. 
At issue across the nuances of the national settings is a deep 
challenge to the core claim of democracy to be the superior form 
of political organization of civilized peoples. It is odd, and highly 
dispiriting, to have to engage this question so soon after democ-
racy seemed ascendant as never before. With the collapse of the 
 
 1 Jan-Werner Müller, What Is Populism? 43 (Pennsylvania 2016). 
 2 Id at 42. 
 3 Id at 20. 
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Soviet Union and its empire, the twentieth century concluded 
with democracy having defeated its two great authoritarian ri-
vals, and the popular election of governments spread across a 
greater swath of the earth than ever before. The imprecise con-
tours of ascendant democracy included generally robust markets, 
welfarist protections for citizens, a broad commitment to secular-
ism (even in countries with an established church), and liberal 
tolerance of dissent and rival political organizations. All of this 
was packaged in robust constitutional protections of civil liberties 
and the integrity of the political order. Francis Fukuyama’s em-
bellished claim that the end of history was upon us4 accurately 
captured the sense that electoral democracy alone seemed to lay 
claim to political legitimacy.5 Further, the opening to democracy 
invited economic liberalization, and the resulting market ex-
changes were allowing huge masses to rise from poverty, even in 
holdout autocratic states like China or Vietnam. 
Clearly the era of democratic euphoria has ended. The rise of 
Islamic terrorism and the failure of the Arab Spring were cer-
tainly warning shots, but grave as these might be, they did not 
challenge the core of democratic government. The inevitable 
trade-off between security and liberty that accompanies external 
threats to democratic regimes is a serious challenge and can itself 
compromise core legitimacy. But democracies that withstood 
what Professor Philip Bobbitt terms the “long war” of the twenti-
eth century6 were unlikely to come undone in the face of enemies 
who sought to target civilians but were in no position to pose a 
sustained military threat of any kind. Even the problematic mili-
tary engagements in Afghanistan or Iraq bitterly divided demo-
cratic societies but did not threaten an epochal confrontation with 
democracy itself. 
 
 4 See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History?, 16 Natl Interest 3, 4 (Summer 1989) 
(“What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, . . . but the end of history 
as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization 
of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.”). 
 5 At the peak of the democratic wave, in 2000, Freedom House listed 120 countries, 
63 percent of all nations, as meeting the baseline criteria for democratic governance. 
Adrian Karatnycky, Freedom in the World 2000 (Freedom House, 2000), archived at 
http://perma.cc/7DMN-H6EX (“[E]lectoral democracies constitute 120 of the 192 interna-
tionally recognized independent polities.”). 
 6 Philip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History xxi–
xxii (Alfred A. Knopf 2002) (“This war . . . began in 1914 and only ended in 1990. The Long 
War, like previous epochal wars, brought into being a new form of the State—the market-
state.”). 
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Instead, the current moment of democratic uncertainty 
draws from four central institutional challenges, each one a com-
promise of how democracy was consolidated over the past few cen-
turies. The four I wish to address are: first, the accelerated decline 
of political parties and other institutional forms of popular en-
gagement; second, the paralysis of the legislative branches; third, 
the loss of a sense of social cohesion; and fourth, the decline in 
state competence. While there are no doubt other candidates for 
inducing anxiety over the state of democracy, these four have a 
particular salience in theories of democratic superiority that 
make their decline or loss a matter of grave concern. Among the 
great defenses of democracy stand the claims that democracies 
offer the superior form of participation, of deliberation, of solidar-
ity, and of the capacity to get the job done. We need not arbitrate 
among the theories of participatory democracy, deliberative de-
mocracy, solidaristic democracy, or epistemic democratic superi-
ority. Rather, we should note with concern that each of these 
theories states a claim for the advantages of democracy, and each 
faces worrisome disrepair. 
I.  PARTICIPATION: FAILING POLITICAL PARTIES 
[P]olitical parties created democracy and [ ] modern democ-
racy is unthinkable save in terms of the parties. 
—E.E. Schattschneider7 
[P]arties [are] the distinctive, defining voluntary associations 
of representative democracy. 
—Nancy L. Rosenblum8 
One indicator of the age of the American Constitution is the 
absence of any role for political parties, by contrast to Article 21 
of the German Constitution, for example.9 The Framers of the US 
Constitution equated parties with factions, and aimed for a form 
of democratic politics that would rise above sectional concerns, 
immediate gratification of wants, and the risk of succumbing to 
the passions of greed and envy. But as early as the first contested 
presidential election in 1796, the Founding generation discovered 
the need to coordinate national candidacies in furtherance of a 
 
 7 E.E. Schattschneider, Party Government 1 (Farrar & Rinehart 1942). 
 8 Nancy L. Rosenblum, On the Side of the Angels: An Appreciation of Parties and 
Partisanship 459 (Princeton 2008). 
 9 See Ger Const Art 21. 
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political program. They quickly formed the very factions they had 
sought to avoid, now organized as incipient political parties. Even 
in the Founding era, partisan actors learned that they could not 
mobilize the rather inert mass of the population into a national 
campaign without coordination of resources, messages, and pro-
grammatic commitments for governing. Each of these undertak-
ings required not only the right of citizens to participate elec-
torally in self-governance, but the creation of intermediary 
institutions that could mobilize citizens into partisans. 
Not until the twentieth century were political parties granted 
constitutional recognition as part of the fabric of democratic poli-
tics—indeed, the first nineteenth-century constitution that ad-
dressed the status of political parties was that of Colombia in 
1886, and there in order to ban parties. By contrast, the constitu-
tions of the twentieth century privileged political parties as the 
galvanizing force of democratic politics.10 
As experience in electoral self-government grew, democrats 
throughout the world learned that parties provide a forum for the 
integration of the different interests that must coalesce for suc-
cessful policymaking, more so in first-past-the-post elections than 
in proportional representation systems. Even in parliamentary 
systems, some form of aggregation is necessary to draw sufficient 
attention to the party platform and to make the party a desirable 
suitor in forming a governing coalition. But mostly parties were 
the institutional mechanism for translating interests and ideol-
ogy into governance. Politics is the art of the possible, even if what 
is possible and necessary at any particular moment fails to in-
spire. Without parties, responsible and productive governance 
rested on the happenstance of enlightened leaders rather than an 
institutionalized mechanism for taking hard decisions, cutting 
deals, accepting short-term costs for longer-term gain, and all the 
mechanisms that define wise stewardship. 
In the United States, parties served as the political expres-
sion of the spirit of voluntary associations critical to the young 
Republic. As Alexis de Tocqueville noted, “Americans of all ages, 
all conditions, and all dispositions, constantly form associations. 
 
 10 See Tom Ginsburg, Constitutions as Political Institutions, in Jennifer Gandhi and 
Rubén Ruiz-Rufino, eds, Routledge Handbook of Comparative Political Institutions 101, 
106 (Routledge 2015) (“In our work on the Comparative Constitutions Project, [Zachary] 
Elkins, [James] Melton, and I identify certain core provisions to written constitutions. . . . 
In the nineteenth century . . . few constitutions mentioned political parties, while most 
written in the twentieth century do so.”). 
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. . . Wherever, at the head of some new undertaking, you see the 
government in France, or a man of rank in England, in the United 
States you will be sure to find an association.”11 By the time 
Tocqueville came to America, political parties were emerging as 
among the most salient of these associations. As they matured 
through the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, parties 
provided the organizational resources for political campaigns, se-
lected candidates, coordinated platforms, and disseminated infor-
mation about politics.12 In exchange, parties dispensed patronage 
and access to power, the glue that held the activist wings of the 
party in check and that allowed a coordinating discipline to be 
imposed on the party’s elected representatives.13 As I have writ-
ten elsewhere, the organizational fabric of parties came undone 
in the United States in the late twentieth century, partially as a 
result of legal reforms that left significant aspects of party gov-
ernance outside the control of party leaders,14 and partially 
through external factors, such as the rise of low-cost social me-
dia and the mechanisms of direct access to funding and the party 
constituency.15 
Examined globally, the American experience of tottering po-
litical parties appears emblematic rather than exceptional. The 
result in country after country is the dissolution of the discipline 
of political parties in favor of a politics of free agency formed 
largely around the personae of individuals or momentary issues, 
devoid of a sustaining institutional presence. In the American 
context, Professor Richard Pildes describes this central feature of 
contemporary politics as the process of political fragmentation: 
“[T]he external diffusion of political power away from the polit-
ical parties as a whole and the internal diffusion of power away 
from the party leadership to individual party members and 
officeholders.”16 
 
 11 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 979 (Floating Press 2009) (Henry 
Reeve, trans) (originally published 1840). 
 12 See V.O. Key Jr, Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups 210–11, 244 (Thomas Y. 
Crowell 1942). 
 13 See id at 243–44; Samuel Issacharoff, Outsourcing Politics: The Hostile Takeover 
of Our Hollowed-Out Political Parties, 54 Houston L Rev 845, 858 (2017). 
 14 See Issacharoff, 54 Houston L Rev at 864–66 (cited in note 13). 
 15 See id at 866–70. 
 16 Richard H. Pildes, Romanticizing Democracy, Political Fragmentation, and the De-
cline of American Government, 124 Yale L J 804, 809 (2014). 
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But the breaking up of central institutions extends far be-
yond the domain of politics—the economic conglomerates of yes-
teryear, such as ITT and Gulf & Western, were long since disman-
tled in favor of independent specialized units.17 In the political 
domain, fragmentation is a fact of life in all democratic countries, 
meaning that attempts to find the causal roots at the national 
level will necessarily be incomplete. The process of what is termed 
“fissuring” in labor economics18 reflects the broad destabilization 
of large integrated organizations in the face of technological 
change, ease of communication, globalization, and other pres-
sures on previous advantages of scale. Whether across supply 
markets or in the domain of politics, ease of communication and 
transportation puts pressure on broad horizontal organizations 
whose prime advantage was access to markets, economic or polit-
ical. In Coasean terms, it becomes less administratively burden-
some to buy rather than make, and firms can become a purer form 
of their particularized specialization. 
The same is true in the political domain, in which access to 
voters and donors is no longer coordinated through the large um-
brella of the political parties. Populists eschew political parties 
and social media allows direct appeals for both money and sup-
port.19 Part of the ability of populists to bypass established 
party structures is no doubt the failure of the political parties 
to adapt to the modern era. But the cumulative result is the 
decline of the parties as the locus of democratic politics and the 
rise of the individual-centered definition of politics. As parties 
fragment, a spiral ensues. Targeting specific groups of voters, 
activists, and donors requires more focused and generally more 
 
 17 See Gerald F. Davis, Kristina A. Diekmann, and Catherine H. Tinsley, The Decline 
and Fall of the Conglomerate Firm in the 1980s: The Deinstitutionalization of an Organi-
zational Form, 59 Am Sociological Rev 547, 563 (1994) (discussing the rapid shift away 
from the conglomerate form in the 1980s, including Gulf & Western’s reorganization as 
Paramount Communications); John G. Matsusaka, Corporate Diversification, Value Max-
imization, and Organizational Capabilities, 74 J Bus 409, 412–14 (2001) (charting acqui-
sitions and divestments by Gulf & Western and ITT from 1958 to 1988). See also Edward 
B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U Pa L Rev 1907, 1921–22 
(2013) (describing incentives for conglomerates to spinoff “unrelated businesses” and 
noting such spinoffs by Sears, CBS, DuPont, and AT&T). 
 18 See generally David Weil, The Fissured Workplace: Why Work Became So Bad for 
So Many and What Can Be Done to Improve It (Harvard 2014). 
 19 For a more detailed discussion of how direct-democratic procedures, such as di-
rect appeals to voters by populist candidates, weaken political parties, see Emanuel V. 
Towfigh, et al, Do Direct-Democratic Procedures Lead to Higher Acceptance Than Polit-
ical Representation? Experimental Survey Evidence from Germany, 167 Pub Choice 47, 
49 (2016). 
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extreme messages. Broad-tent parties become an impediment 
to a new form of politics that channels passion rather than re-
warding the necessarily limited returns from governance. More 
broadly, the disengagement from the parties leads to what 
Professor Emanuel Towfigh terms the “party paradox,” in which 
parties, though necessary to democratic functioning, become a 
contributing source of disenchantment with the political process: 
“This paradox of representation may reduce the acceptance of 
political decisions by the electorate and contribute to the over-
all disillusion with democracy.”20 The result, well captured by 
Professor Peter Mair in his work on “hollowed out” European 
democracies, is that politics “has become part of an external 
world which people view from outside,” as opposed to the old 
world in which they participated.21 
Weakened political parties do not have the institutional for-
titude to withstand hostile challenges from outsiders, as evi-
dent in the United States, where President Trump and Senator 
Bernie Sanders (the former a marginal affiliate of the Republicans, 
the latter not even a member of the Democratic Party) were able 
to displace established party figures, and in the case of Trump, 
walk away with the party endorsement and ultimately the pres-
idency. In place of programs and governance, candidacies are 
now centered on individuals and elections are framed as refer-
enda on the leadership of those individuals. Even in Germany, 
the country that has best resisted the assault on democratic in-
stitutions, there is a noted increase in the personalization of the 
campaigns of Chancellor Angela Merkel.22 Candidate-driven 
elections are increasingly the norm in Europe as parties that 
emerged from the capacity to gain parliamentary representation 
 
 20 Id at 48–49. 
 21 Peter Mair, Ruling the Void: The Hollowing of Western Democracy 43 (Verso 2013). 
 22 See Harald Schoen and Robert Greszki, A Third Term for a Popular Chancellor: 
An Analysis of Voting Behaviour in the 2013 German Federal Election, 23 German Polit 
251, 251 (2014): 
In the 2013 German federal election, the trend towards increased electoral vol-
atility and fragmentation continued. . . . [I]n the 2009 election the conservative 
CDU/CSU fought a personalised campaign in which it aimed successfully to cap-
italise on Merkel’s increased popularity. In the 2013 election, the CDU/CSU 
campaign was, once again, focused on Chancellor Merkel, who was now the un-
challenged leader of her party. 
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are no longer needed as an electoral platform.23 Even the desul-
tory elections for the European Parliament witnessed an effort 
to attract personalities to the candidate roster in a vain attempt 
to boost voter turnout.24 Direct candidate appeal to voters goes 
hand in hand with the documented fragmentation of political par-
ties in, among other places, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Denmark, Ecuador, 
Finland, France, Guatemala, India, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, 
and Thailand.25 Mair summarizes this well: 
Parties are failing, in other words, as a result of a process of 
mutual withdrawal or abandonment, whereby citizens re-
treat into private life or into more specialized and often ad 
hoc forms of representation, while the party leaderships re-
treat into the institutions, drawing their terms of reference 
ever more readily from their roles as governors or public-
office holders.26 
In this sense, the desperate gambit of Prime Minister David 
Cameron to seek to solidify his political base by appealing to ple-
biscitary alternatives to parliament emerges from the failure of 
political discipline in the legislative setting.27 It well follows the 
 
 23 See generally Chris J. Bickerton and Carlo Invernizzi Accetti, Democracy without 
Parties? Italy after Berlusconi, 85 Polit Q 23 (2014) (describing fragmentation across the 
spectrum of Italian politics). See also Marc Bühlmann, David Zumbach, and Marlène 
Gerber, Campaign Strategies in the 2015 Swiss National Elections: Nationalization, Coor-
dination, and Personalization, 22 Swiss Polit Sci Rev 15, 25 (2016) (“[T]he personalization 
with nationwide ‘party stars’ is a new phenomenon in Switzerland.”). 
 24 See, for example, Hermann Schmitt, Sara Hobolt, and Sebastian Adrian Popa, Does 
Personalization Increase Turnout? Spitzenkandidaten in the 2014 European Parliament Elec-
tions, 16 EU Polit 347, 347–48 (2015): 
The 2014 European Parliament elections were the first elections where the ma-
jor political groups each nominated a lead candidate (Spitzenkandidat) for the 
Commission presidency in the hope that this would increase the visibility of the 
elections and mobilize more citizens to turn out. 
. . . 
The potential to increase political participation was . . . at the heart of the 
European Commission’s support for the Spitzenkandidaten innovation, as they 
hoped this could ‘contribute to raising the turnout for European elections.’ 
 25 See Pedro O.S. Vaz de Melo, How Many Political Parties Should Brazil Have? A 
Data-Driven Method to Assess and Reduce Fragmentation in Multi-party Political Systems, 
10 PLOS One 1, 2 (Oct 14, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/27ZA-2EY2. 
 26 Mair, Ruling the Void at 16 (cited in note 21). 
 27 See David Cameron Promises In/Out Referendum on EU (BBC, Jan 23, 2013), 
archived at http://perma.cc/DAG4-RGHX (describing pressures that Cameron faced from 
within his own Conservative Party and from challenger UKIP that pushed him to call 
for the Brexit referendum); Tom McTague, Alex Spence, and Edward-Isaac Dovere, How 
David Cameron Blew It (Politico, Sept 12, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/X4AP-MGL2 
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pattern in the European Union of seeking to alter its perceived 
democratic deficit through greater use of referenda and other 
tools of direct democracy.28 Put less delicately, Nigel Farage, the 
leader of the UK Independence Party (UKIP), touted the Brexit 
vote as the story of the British people telling the political elite to 
stick it: “It is, after all, rather extraordinary that more than half 
the voting population defied a large majority of its own elected 
parliament, all of the traditional political parties, and virtually 
every important institution in the country—from the Central 
Bank to the leaders of industry to the trade unions.”29 Nor did the 
Brexit fiasco prevent embattled Italian Prime Minister Matteo 
Renzi from turning to a constitutional referendum to shore up his 
government in 2016, with the same disastrous results.30 The im-
mediate need to seek political ballast through a plebiscite may 
reflect the momentary political crises in Britain or Italy. But the 
allure of referenda reflects the disenchantment with political par-
ties, and the desperate effort to restore governing authority 
simply confirms the weakness of parliaments as authoritative in-
stitutions. Rather than offering a lifeline to government, these 
referenda are a desperate gambit reflecting the problems that 
gave rise to Brexit in the first place: “[T]ensions have grown in 
most Western nations between the existing processes of repre-
sentative democracy and calls by reformists for a more participa-
tory style of democratic government.”31 
If Brexit highlights the perceived weakness of political par-
ties as coordinators of democratic politics, it raises the question 
of the root cause of that weakness. In substantial part, the weak-
ness follows from the simple fact that the parties cannot claim 
to speak for much of a constituency. In other words, they have 
significantly lost their participatory quality. To give but one ex-
ample, in 1950, 20 percent of Britons were members of political 
 
(describing organizational and legislative failures by Cameron’s Conservative Party pre-
ceding the Brexit referendum). 
 28 See, for example, Andres Auer, European Citizens’ Initiative: Article I-46.43 1 Eur 
Const L Rev 79, 79 (2005) (outlining the EU’s “new device of participatory democracy”). 
 29 Jeremy Shapiro, Brexit Was a Rejection of Britain’s Governing Elite. Too Bad the 
Elites Were Right. (Vox, June 25, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/9586-AQA7. 
 30 See Jason Horowitz, Italy’s Premier, Matteo Renzi, Says He’ll Resign after Reform 
Is Rejected (NY Times, Dec 4, 2016), online at http://www.nytimes 
.com/2016/12/04/world/europe/italy-matteo-renzi-referendum.html?smid=pl-share&_r=0 
(visited Oct 11, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable) (“Prime Minister Matteo Renzi said he 
would resign after voters decisively rejected constitutional changes.”). 
 31 Russell J. Dalton, Wilhelm Bürklin, and Andrew Drummond, Public Opinion and 
Direct Democracy, 12 J Democracy 141, 141 (Oct 2001). 
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parties; as of 2014, that figure was about 1 percent.32 In the 
United States, according to the Pew Research Center’s yearly 
studies of American political behavior, party identification is at 
an observed all-time low. Currently, 39 percent of Americans 
identify as independents, 32 percent as Democrats, and 23 per-
cent as Republicans: “This is the highest percentage of independ-
ents in more than 75 years of public opinion polling.”33 
Party failures are intrinsically connected to the demise of the 
institutional supports of those parties. Throughout the twentieth 
century, parties relied heavily on other forms of organization to 
provide their active constituency. For the Democratic Party in the 
United States, for the Labour Party in Britain, and for the social-
democratic parties of Western Europe, that organizational back-
ing came heavily from the labor unions.34 For the Republicans in 
the United States and the Tories in Britain, and the Christian 
democrats and conservative parties in Europe, the organizational 
ties were to the chambers of commerce or other locally based rep-
resentatives of small businesses and agricultural interests.35 
Taking the United States as an example, the decline of un-
derlying institutions is as precipitous as the decline of parties. 
Union density today is at an all-time low since the New Deal cre-
ated federally mandated rights of collective bargaining. Union de-
cline captures only a part of the picture. Significant as well is the 
shift in composition of the unionized workforce reflected in the 
domination of unionization in the public sector. While about 11 
percent of the American workforce is unionized, the figure for the 
private sector has fallen below 7 percent, while public sector un-
ionization remains at about 35 percent.36 Not only have unions 
declined outright, but perhaps more significantly, they have 
 
 32 What’s Gone Wrong with Democracy (The Economist, Mar 1, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/2KWC-8XCH. 
 33 Trends in Party Identification, 1939–2014 (Pew Research Center, Apr 7, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/N9C8-SZBM. 
 34 See generally J. David Greenstone, Labor in American Politics (Knopf 1969) (doc-
umenting American labor’s symbiotic relationship with the Democratic Party through the 
first half of the twentieth century); Peter L. Francia, Assessing the Labor-Democratic Party 
Alliance: A One-Sided Relationship?, 42 Polity 293 (2010) (contrasting modern organized 
labor’s continued support for Democratic candidates with Democratic failures to deliver 
pro-labor policy). 
 35 See generally Daniel Ziblatt, Conservative Parties and the Birth of Democracy 
(Cambridge 2017) (chronicling the organizational rise of the British and German conserva-
tive parties). 
 36 Megan Dunn and James Walker, Union Membership in the United States *2–4 (US 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Sept 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/5VPC-YDKB. 
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ceased to be an independent source of support for political parties 
outside the state realm. To the extent that unions centrally be-
come the expression of public employees, they no longer organize 
a constituency independent of the political realm. Instead, labor 
unions are largely an expression of the political party to which 
they are affiliated, and become another political actor whose for-
tunes are tied to that party’s electoral capabilities.37 Not surpris-
ingly, efforts to consolidate Republican political power at the state 
level, as exemplified by Governor Scott Walker in Wisconsin, seek 
to undermine the power of public-sector unions as a proxy for the 
Democratic Party. These are not battles reflective of participatory 
engagement by diverse sectors of the society, but power struggles 
within the state itself. 
On the other side of the ledger, we find a corresponding ero-
sion of broadscale institutional engagement. In the United States 
the best example comes from the evolution of the Chamber of 
Commerce from the organizational representative of local enter-
prise to the exponent of the interests of concentrated capital: 
“Mention the Chamber of Commerce, and most people think of a 
benign organization comprised mostly of small business owners 
who meet for networking and mutual support in local chapters 
across the U.S. But today’s Chamber is anything but that.”38 The 
Chamber’s interests are now highly focused around a small num-
ber of industries and interests, including “tobacco, banking, and 
fossil fuels.”39 According to one article, 64 donors were responsible 
for more than 50 percent of all donations to the Chamber, while 
 
 37 The concern over the legal implications of the distinct role of public-sector union-
ism in the United States goes back at least to Harry H. Wellington and Ralph K. Winter 
Jr, The Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 78 Yale L J 1107, 1116, 
1124–25 (1969). 
 38 David Brodwin, The Chamber’s Secrets (US News & World Report, Oct 22, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/8SJU-E53D. See also generally Alyssa Katz, The Influence 
Machine: The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Corporate Capture of American Life 
(Spiegel & Grau 2015). 
 39 Brodwin, The Chamber’s Secrets (cited in note 38): 
Founded in 1912, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce has been shaped by its CEO 
Tom Donohue into a powerful lobbying and campaigning machine that pursues 
a fairly narrow special-interest agenda. It’s now the largest lobbying organiza-
tion in the U.S. (ranked by budget). It mostly represents the interests of a hand-
ful of so-called “legacy industries”—industries like tobacco, banking and fossil 
fuels which have been around for generations and learned how to parley their 
earnings into political influence. The Chamber seeks favorable treatment for 
them, for example, through trade negotiations, tax treatment, regulations and 
judicial rulings. 
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94 percent of its donations came from a pool of just 1,500 top 
donors.40 
Across the political spectrum, parties become tied not to 
broad-based constituency organizations, but to much narrower 
sectional interests, already well entrenched in the corridors of 
power. The claim of parties as a special arena of participatory en-
gagement in the democratic project wanes accordingly. The par-
ties emerge hollowed out, just as do their organizational bases of 
support. 
II.  DELIBERATION: THE WEAKNESS OF LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES 
[Deliberative] collective decision-making ought to be different 
from bargaining, contracting and other market-type interactions, 
both in its explicit attention to considerations of the common ad-
vantage and in the ways that that attention helps to form the aims 
of the participants. 
—Joshua Cohen41 
[T]he democratic method is that institutional arrangement for 
arriving at political decisions which realizes the common good by 
making the people itself decide issues through the election of indi-
viduals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will. 
—Joseph A. Schumpeter42 
Rarely would Professor Joshua Cohen and Joseph Schumpeter 
be lumped together in theories of democratic legitimacy. Yet they 
both look to a discursive element to raise the capacity of demo-
cratic governance to reach the common good, and to reach beyond 
mere sectional claims on spoils. For Cohen and the more classic 
deliberativist tradition, the domain of discourse is in public par-
ticipation and direct engagement.43 For Schumpeter and those in 
his tradition, myself included, elite competition in the electoral 
arena provides the foundations for citizen engagement and edu-
cation, and the ensuing retrospective accountability for the exer-
cise of governmental power.44 
 
 40 Id. See also Katz, The Influence Machine at xiii (cited in note 38) (discussing the 
“undisclosed financial contributions to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce” made by “indus-
tries that provide vital goods and services but at mounting costs to society”). 
 41 Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in Alan Hamlin and Philip 
Pettit, eds, The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State 17, 17 (Basil Blackwell 1989). 
 42 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy 250 (George Allen 
& Unwin 1976) (originally published 1942). 
 43 Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy at 21–26 (cited in note 41). 
 44 See Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy at 247–49 (cited in note 42). 
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Under either view, democratic political theory justly empha-
sizes the educational gains of deliberation in an engaged citi-
zenry.45 Even when citizens in modern democracies govern 
through representatives rather than as a collective body, periodic 
elections guarantee that citizens encounter political arguments 
that may be removed from their everyday lives.46 Elections compel 
deliberation among the citizenry as candidates and parties at-
tempt to sway and educate. That deliberation then translates into 
the legislative arena as elected officials seek to translate cam-
paign promises into governing policies. 
For present purposes, we limit our discussion to the institu-
tionalization of deliberation in the legislative arena rather than 
in the lived experiences of the citizenry. Democracies are con-
ceived around legislative power, from Magna Carta’s parliamen-
tary check on the Crown, to the expansive role of Congress defined 
by Article I of the Constitution, to the revolutionary emergence of 
parliamentary power throughout the nineteenth century. Collo-
quially, Americans once spoke of the Senate as the “world’s great-
est deliberative body.”47 It is no overstatement to say that this is 
the world’s ennobling democratic inheritance. Or, put another 
way, the hallmark moments of twentieth-century authoritarian 
rule are intertwined with the rejection of parliamentary deliber-
ation and with compromise in favor of the plebiscitary triumphs 
of a Hitler or Mussolini.48 
The legislative arena, at least in theory, is the clearest insti-
tutionalized setting for democratic deliberation. In its classic ren-
dition, it is the arena in which “participants of deliberation, before 
counting votes, are open to transform their preferences in the 
 
 45 See Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy at 18–20 (cited in note 41). 
 46 Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy at 248–49 (cited in note 42). 
 47 See George Packer, The Empty Chamber (New Yorker, Aug 9, 2010), archived at 
http://perma.cc/SR7D-72JJ. 
 48 Hitler’s regime consolidated power through a number of direct referenda in the 
1930s, including those withdrawing Germany from the League of Nations and combining 
the offices of chancellor and president into that of the führer. These referenda were initi-
ated and controlled by the German executive branch. See generally Arnold J. Zurcher, The 
Hitler Referenda, 29 Am Polit Sci Rev 91 (1935). In Italy, Mussolini maneuvered to give 
the Fascist Grand Council the power to approve election lists throughout the 1920s, 
shifting the Italian parliament from a deliberative (though gridlocked) electoral body to 
a single-party “Corporative Chamber” approved by popular plebiscite: “Our aim is to cre-
ate a Corporative Chamber without an opposition. We have no desire nor need for any 
political opposition.” The Fascist Grand Council and the Italian Election, 5 Bull Intl News 
3, 4 (1929) (quoting Mussolini). 
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light of well-articulated and persuasive arguments.”49 On this 
view, the process of deliberation transforms democratic politics 
because it “requires the participants to display the reasons why 
they support a particular stand. It comprehends an exercise of 
mutual justification that allows a thorough type of dialogue be-
fore a collective decision is taken.”50 
Yet, in the modern era, the words “Congress” and “dysfunc-
tion” seem to go together like a horse and carriage, with some 
apology to Frank Sinatra. Consider that the total enacted legisla-
tion annually by the US Congress has declined considerably from 
the 1970s, in which as many as 804 bills were passed, to the most 
recently finished Congress, in which only 329 bills were passed.51 
But focusing on the United States misses much of the picture. 
Across a number of markers, the legislative branches of mature 
democracies have declined as centers of policy debate and for-
mation. In their place, executives have adopted more muscular 
policymaking roles, checked primarily by courts. 
This is a large topic to which I have devoted an entire mon-
ograph.52 But for the current presentation, consider just one par-
tial indicator of the trend over time in the United States. Since 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s fabled first hundred days in of-
fice ushered in the transformative New Deal, presidents have rou-
tinely devoted themselves to hitting the ground running, using 
the initial period of pride among the partisans and disorganiza-
tion among the vanquished to show muscular leadership. The ef-
fort to blaze through the first hundred days has not changed, but 
the form has. The number of legislative initiatives of the first hun-
dred days has dropped steadily, from seventy-six new statutes 
under Roosevelt, to seven and fourteen under Presidents 
George W. Bush and Barack Obama, respectively.53 Even 
though, of course, presidents do not pass legislation, and even 
though they might often confront a Congress or a chamber with 
an opposition majority, the drop-off does not mean presidential 
 
 49 Conrado Hübner Mendes, Constitutional Courts and Deliberative Democracy 14 
(Oxford 2013). 
 50 Id at 15. 
 51 Statistics and Historical Comparison (GovTrack), archived at 
http://perma.cc/3BVH-AT7D (showing that the 95th Congress passed 804 bills while the 
114th Congress passed 329). 
 52 See generally Samuel Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies: Contested Power in the 
Era of Constitutional Courts (Cambridge 2015). 
 53 Julia Azari, A President’s First 100 Days Really Do Matter (FiveThirtyEight, Jan 
17, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/852T-G5DF. 
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inaction. While legislation has dropped, executive decrees have 
increased throughout the modern period. Consistent with this 
trend, President Trump had no significant legislative activity at 
all during his first hundred days in office, and the number of sub-
stantial legislative initiatives amounted to zero.54 
The failure of the participatory side of democratic politics ties 
directly to the difficulties encountered on the deliberative side. 
Parliamentary democracies are centered on the parties. Candi-
dates run as part of a slate, and the demand for a larger share of 
seats in parliament is what offers the prospect of national stew-
ardship. In theory, there are so many competing interests, and 
such inconsistency in potential political outcomes depending on 
who has control of setting the agenda and deciding what is pre-
sented in what form, that there is a risk of complete incoherence 
in the legislative process.55 The cycling-of-preferences problem, 
the great insight of Professor Kenneth Arrow and the ensuing 
study of public-choice theory, threatens to collapse the capacity of 
any legislative body charged with policy leadership.56 The need for 
coordination is apparent, with the Supreme Court long ago ob-
serving that parties emerged “so as to coordinate efforts to secure 
needed legislation and oppose that deemed undesirable.”57 
The result of parliamentary dysfunction is correspondingly 
rising executive unilateralism,58 the increased dependence on ad-
ministrative law to set policy, and the central checking role of the 
courts as restraints on presidentialism—even in formally parlia-
mentary systems. Doctrinally, the absence of congressional action 
not only removes the central democratic branch from the reins of 
 
 54 The major congressional actions took the form of an expedited procedure to with-
draw regulatory decrees within a fast-track window. There were no new legislative initia-
tives of any substance. See David Leonhardt, Donald Trump’s First 100 Days: The Worst 
on Record (NY Times, Apr 26, 2017), online at http://nyti.ms/2pleYVE (visited Oct 11, 
2017) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 55 See Kenneth J. Arrow, A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare, 58 J Polit 
Economy 328, 328–31 (1950) (discussing the confusion attendant to any attempt to amal-
gamate the social and voting preferences of a diverse whole). 
 56 See generally id (laying out Arrow’s impossibility theorem and the inevitability of 
preference cycling). See also Richard H. Pildes and Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Ar-
rows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 
Colum L Rev 2121, 2183–86 (1990) (arguing that institutional arrangements may mediate 
Arrow’s predicted cycling). 
 57 Ray v Blair, 343 US 214, 221 (1952). 
 58 See generally Samuel Issacharoff and Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertari-
anism and Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Approach to Rights during Wartime, 
5 Theoretical Inquiries L 1 (2004) (surveying the response of American courts in periods 
of crisis when the executive asserts a need for unilateral action). 
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government, but also makes judicial constraint more difficult. 
Following Justice Robert Jackson’s famous Steel Seizure typology, 
the power of the executive is at its “lowest ebb” when the presi-
dent seeks to countermand the actions of Congress.59 The un-
stated flip side of Jackson’s observation is that the pathway for 
judicial repudiation of executive action is correspondingly easier 
when Congress has blazed the trail. When Congress fails to act, 
the mechanisms of democratic constraint are compromised. 
For Jackson, congressional inaction posed the most difficult 
issues for democratic governance and, by extension, for the judi-
ciary. As he framed the problem: 
When the President acts in absence of either a congressional 
grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own 
independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which 
he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which 
its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, 
indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a prac-
tical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent 
presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test of 
power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and 
contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theo-
ries of law.60 
In the absence of legislative initiative, executive power natu-
rally rushes to fill the void, whether through governance by direct 
decree or by indirect administrative command. Without the legis-
lative branch offsetting the powers of the executive, the job of de-
fining the boundaries of prerogative power and regulatory author-
ity falls to the judiciary. As Jackson cautioned, the lines of judicial 
engagement are least clear—the “zone of twilight”61—when there 
is institutional failure in the legislature, and the “least dangerous 
branch” finds itself at risk of open conflict with the executive.62 
There is nothing distinctly American about hypertrophic ex-
ecutive power in the modern era. Even before the UK Supreme 
 
 59 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v Sawyer, 343 US 579, 636–38 (1952) (Jackson 
concurring). 
 60 Id at 637 (Jackson concurring). 
 61 Id (Jackson concurring). 
 62 How this conflict plays out is the subject of Rosalind Dixon and Samuel Issacharoff, 
Living to Fight Another Day: Judicial Deferral in Defense of Democracy, 2016 Wis L Rev 
683, 706. 
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Court had to engage the authority of the prime minister to imple-
ment Brexit, a topic to which I shall return in concluding,63 the 
British government confronted the military consequences of ex-
ecutive unilateralism in the disastrous Iraqi campaign.64 One 
proposal, from the House of Lords Select Committee on the 
Constitution, would have implemented limitations similar to 
those of the American War Powers Act,65 obligating parliamen-
tary approval for any long-term military engagement.66 As future 
Prime Minister Gordon Brown observed at the time, “Now that 
there has been a vote on these issues so clearly and in such con-
troversial circumstances, I think it is unlikely that except in the 
most exceptional circumstances a government would choose not 
to have a vote in Parliament [before deploying troops].”67 The lack 
of accountability and the absence of parliamentary engagement 
was confirmed by the 2016 Chilcot Report, whose many condem-
nations of Prime Minister Tony Blair included criticism of unilat-
eral decisionmaking by the executive.68 
It is not possible in this one exposition to engage the exten-
sive discussions at the level of national democracies on parlia-
mentary failure to check the executive. A review of the literature 
shows a persistent theme among both academic commentators 
and pundits to be the collapse of responsible government at the 
 
 63 See notes 108–12 and accompanying text. 
 64 See generally House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Waging War: 
Parliament’s Role and Responsibility (HL Paper 236-I, July 26, 2006), archived at 
http://perma.cc/MF99-F78K. 
 65 Pub L No 93-148, 87 Stat 555 (1973), codified as amended at 50 USC § 1541 et seq. 
 66 Waging War at *5 (cited in note 64) (“The purpose of our inquiry has been to 
consider what alternatives there are to the use of the Royal prerogative power in the 
deployment of armed force . . . and in particular whether Parliamentary approval should 
be required for any deployment of British forces outside the United Kingdom.”). In the 
following years, the interplay between the prime minister and Parliament developed in-
formally, until the point in 2014 when “the prime minister acknowledged that a convention 
of Commons approval now existed.” Philippe Lagassé, Parliament and the War Prerogative 
in the United Kingdom and Canada: Explaining Variations in Institutional Change and 
Legislative Control, 70 Parliamentary Aff 280, 289 (2017). 
 67 Brown Calls for MPs to Decide War (BBC News, Apr 30, 2005), archived at 
http://perma.cc/86MH-QDHX. 
 68 See The Report of the Iraq Inquiry: Executive Summary, HC 264, 58, 83 (July 6, 
2016), archived at http://perma.cc/H5T3-EWNR (critiquing Blair’s actions, the report 
noted that “there should have been a collective discussion by a Cabinet Committee or small 
group of Ministers on the basis of inter-departmental advice agreed at a senior level be-
tween officials at a number of decision points which had a major impact on the develop-
ment of UK policy before the invasion of Iraq”). 
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parliamentary level.69 The causes for that collapse identified in 
the academic literature include concerns about thresholds of rep-
resentation, party fragmentation, increasing presidentialism and 
semipresidentialism, and the displacement of parliamentary au-
thority by international accords or, in the case of Europe, the 
overreach of Brussels.70 Pundits are more inclined to point to the 
venality or corruption of parliamentary officials, though in some 
countries, such as Brazil, the two come together.71 
 
 69 See, for example, Michael Foley, The British Presidency: Tony Blair and the Poli-
tics of Public Leadership 108 (Manchester 2000) (noting “that Blair and his followers op-
erated on the assumption that parliament was no longer a central force of political signif-
icance”); Zachary Karabell, How the GOP Made Obama One of America’s Most Powerful 
Presidents (Politico, Apr 14, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/AN8D-BBHE (positing that 
Republicans in Congress as “the so-called Party of No only provoked the Obama admin-
istration into finding innovative ways to exercise [greater unilateral] power . . . . Rather 
than containing the White House, congressional Republicans liberated it”). 
 70 See generally, for example, Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 Nw U L Rev 1 
(2012) (describing how regulations passed in Brussels can result in the globalization of 
standards); Cynthia R. Farina, Congressional Polarization: Terminal Constitutional Dys-
function?, 115 Colum L Rev 1689 (2015) (synthesizing political science literature about 
congressional polarization); Mattias Kumm, The Legitimacy of International Law: A Con-
stitutional Framework of Analysis, 15 Eur J Intl L 907 (2004) (discussing conflicts between 
international law and national domestic self-government); Juan J. Linz, The Perils of Pres-
identialism, 1 J Democracy 51 (Winter 1990) (arguing that presidentialism is less con-
ducive to democracy than parliamentarism); Melanie Amann, Thomas Darnstädt, and 
Dietmar Hipp, Is Germany’s Parliamentary Hurdle Obsolete? (Spiegel Online, Oct 4, 2013), 
archived at http://perma.cc/9GG5-RT8Z (surveying political scientists’ critiques of the 
Bundestag’s 5 percent hurdle to seat parties). See also, for example, Pildes, 124 Yale L J 
at 809 (cited in note 16) (positing that political fragmentation is a cause of recent govern-
ment dysfunction, such as “the inability of party leaders to bring along recalcitrant minor-
ity factions of their parties”). 
 71 An astonishing number of Brazil’s members of Congress have faced indictment in 
recent years. See, for example, Anthony Boadle and Alonso Soto, Brazil’s Indicted Senate 
Head Removed by Supreme Court (Reuters, Dec 5, 2016), archived at 
http://perma.cc/34HH-ER3N (reporting the removal of the Senate president following an 
indictment); Paul Kiernan, Brazil Former Official Is Sentenced, Wall St J A7 (Mar 31, 
2017) (reporting the sentencing of the former House Speaker Eduardo Cunha to prison for 
corruption “in a case that has landed scores of politicians and businessmen behind bars”); 
Dom Phillips, Prominent Leader Is Sentenced in Brazil, NY Times A9 (Mar 31, 2017) (re-
porting the sentencing of the former House speaker to “one of [the] stiffest penalties meted 
out to a top political figure in Brazil in recent years,” as part of an investigation that “has 
shaken Brazil’s political and business establishments to their core”). The problem is not 
limited to Congress, as shown by the conviction and sentencing of former President Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva, see Ernesto Londoño, Ex-President of Brazil Sentenced to Nearly 10 
Years in Prison for Corruption (NY Times, July 12, 2017), online at http://www 
.nytimes.com/2017/07/12/world/americas/brazil-lula-da-silva-corruption.html (visited Oct 
11, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable), and by the explosive public removal trial of current 
President Michel Temer, resulting in a divided vote of the Electoral Court on his removal. 
See Simon Romero and Dom Phillips, Court in Brazil Clears President Michel Temer in 
Campaign Finance Case (NY Times, June 9, 2017), online at http://www 
.nytimes.com/2017/06/09/world/americas/brazil-michel-temer.html (visited Oct 11, 2017) 
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Parliamentary democracies are centered on the parties. Can-
didates run as part of a slate and the demand for a larger share 
of seats in parliament is what offers the prospect of national stew-
ardship. The collapse of parliaments compounds the conse-
quences of the collapse of parties, and the two are both the cause 
and effect of each other. Invariably, the locus of political activity 
shifts to the executive, and the defining feature of democratic pol-
itics turns to the triumphalist claims of the victorious head of 
state. Consider this account of contemporary politics: 
What we are seeing in the presidential campaigns . . . is that 
the more chance the candidates have of winning—or the more 
chance they think they have of winning—the more they are 
prepared to play the game that I call “national presidential-
ism.” They go in for speeches that amount to saying: “If I’m 
elected, then everything . . . is going to be different because 
I’m the only one able to lead this country.” . . . All that mat-
ters is how the candidate is going to be able to restore [the 
nation’s] image once he or she has been given supreme 
power.72 
This account of contemporary politics would ring true in many 
democracies around the world, the United States clearly included. 
In my native Argentina, such “caudillo politics”73 has generally 
been the mark of the demise of democracy rather than its fulfill-
ment. That this particular statement happens to be about France 
and that the speaker is Daniel Cohn-Bendit, the leader of the 1968 
student uprising, only makes it a bit more piquant.74 
 
(Perma archive unavailable). See also Dom Phillips, President Michel Temer of Brazil Is 
Charged with Corruption (NY Times, June 26, 2017), online at http://www.nytimes 
.com/2017/06/26/world/americas/brazil-temer-corruption-charge-joesley-batista.html (vis-
ited Oct 11, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable) (detailing new bribery allegations against 
Temer). 
 72 Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Presidentialism: The French Disease (Esprit, Feb 22, 2012), 
archived at http://perma.cc/BCS7-HHDT. 
 73 The caudillo is the military man on a horse leading a highly personalized political 
movement based on swashbuckling individual authority, rather than lasting political in-
stitutions. The nineteenth-century form of caudillo command, called the caudillaje, is the 
precursor of both populism and military rule. See Eric R. Wolf and Edward C. Hansen, 
Caudillo Politics: A Structural Analysis, 9 Comp Stud Society & Hist 168, 168–69 (1967). 
See also Diego von Vacano, Trump Embraces Caudillo Politics as Latin America Shuns It 
(NBC News, Nov 22, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/4MMG-4TAV. 
 74 See Cohn-Bendit, Presidentialism (cited in note 72). 
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III.  SOLIDARITY: THE THREATS TO SOCIAL COHESION 
A central theme of my work on Fragile Democracies concerns 
the inherent difficulty in democratic governance in the absence of 
a democratic polity. Strikingly, and perhaps paradoxically, elec-
tions are seen in post–World War II state formation as the means 
toward the creation of a democratic state rather than a system of 
choice among those already committed to a common enterprise of 
collective governance.75 In countries emerging from colonial rule 
or despotic regimes, elections were the confirmation of a demo-
cratic transformation, even as they often served as the marker 
of who would hold state authority in a world of unfinished “us-
versus-them” business.76 Our era of diversity may applaud the 
benefits of such broad democratic aspirations, but citizens of 
Burundi or Bosnia-Herzegovina or Iraq would well understand 
the frailties of democracy without a solidaristic commitment to a 
collective future. 
The role of communitarian solidarity suffers from the trau-
mas of the twentieth century, from Nazism to the ethnic slaugh-
ter in the Balkans. One reads back with horror at Carl Schmitt 
proclaiming that “[d]emocracy requires [ ] first homogeneity and 
second . . . elimination or eradication of heterogeneity.”77 The un-
mistakable message is that “[a] democracy demonstrates its po-
litical power by knowing how to refuse or keep at bay something 
foreign and unequal that threatens its homogeneity.”78 
Yet, a look back at our democratic inheritance shows how cen-
tral earlier generations thought the sense of shared identity, and 
that the ties between social cohesion and self-government are not 
an invention of twentieth-century reaction. In the background of 
the Founding documents of constitutionalism in the United 
States is the claim, no doubt jarring from a slave society, that the 
American blessing of liberty could be traced to the conception of 
homogeneity of the population, a claim that hauntingly echoes in 
Schmitt. In the words of John Jay, in Federalist 2: 
Providence has been pleased to give this one connected coun-
try, to one united people, a people descended from the same 
ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same 
 
 75 See Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies at 2 (cited in note 52). 
 76 See id at 2–3. 
 77 Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy 9 (MIT 1988) (Ellen Ken-
nedy, trans) (originally published 1923). 
 78 Id. 
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religion, attached to the same principles of government, very 
similar in their manners and customs, and who, by their joint 
counsels, arms and efforts, fighting side by side throughout a 
long and bloody war, have nobly established their general 
Liberty and Independence.79 
Jay may today be the least celebrated of the authors of The 
Federalist Papers, but the sentiment was widely shared, with 
John Stuart Mill later extending the argument to make it not 
simply an observation about America but a prerequisite for de-
mocracy: “Free institutions are next to impossible in a country 
made up of different nationalities. Among a people without fellow-
feeling, especially if they read and speak different languages, the 
united public opinion necessary to the working of representative 
government can not exist.”80 
Liberal theorists, notably including John Rawls, continued 
into the twentieth century the tradition of making claims for just 
treatment of citizens turn, at least in part, on a shared sense of 
“political traditions and institutions of law, property, and class 
structure, with their sustaining religious and moral beliefs and 
underlying culture. It is these things that shape a society’s polit-
ical will.”81 The arguments do not sound in the need for consan-
guinity so much as the continued importance of a sense of collec-
tive identity in order to sustain citizen self-government. 
Democratic politics has long provided a critical forum in which 
solidarity could blossom. Across democratic societies, political 
parties provided the organizational framework for sports leagues, 
adult education projects, and newspapers—all of which served as 
intermediaries between citizens and the broader society. These 
agencies of civil society are weakened and leave citizens increas-
ingly disengaged from political life, as reflected in declining voter 
participation rates across the democratic world. The problem of a 
lack of collective identity is more acute at the higher levels of ef-
forts at European governance being compromised by trying to 
craft a democracy without a demos. 
Among the contemporary challenges in advanced demo-
cratic societies are significant erosions in the sense of collective 
solidarity that provided the historic glue for the common project 
 
 79 Federalist 2 (Jay), in The Federalist 8, 9 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed). 
 80 John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government 344–45 (Floating 
Press 2009) (originally published 1861). 
 81 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples 106 (Harvard 1999). 
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of democratic governance. For immediate purposes, I focus on 
two: the challenge of immigration and the challenge of declining 
living standards of the broad mass of the population—the toilers 
and voters of democratic states. There are many manifestations 
of contemporary social dissolution. But the combination of eco-
nomic insecurity and the presence of perceived outsiders seems 
invariably to lead to fear of the other as taking over and blame on 
the other for a corresponding loss in social standing and wealth. 
The point here is not the normative claim that this sense is or is 
not justified, or even the positive claim of a causal relation be-
tween immigration and economic malaise. Rather, the issue is the 
democratic challenge posed by widespread sentiments among the 
laboring classes of being under siege. There is not a populist 
movement in a western democracy at present that does not play 
to both xenophobia and economic insecurity. The immediate ques-
tion is why these strains have such force at present, and why they 
seem to operate in tandem. 
While the answers are no doubt complex, they must begin 
with an assessment of the empirical realities of modern demo-
cratic societies, still reeling from the financial meltdown of 2008. 
The brute fact is that there is a loss of cohesion that accompanies 
high periods of immigration until the new immigrants are inte-
grated into the national consensus.82 What Americans celebrate 
as the melting pot is undoubtedly a process of change and recrea-
tion of the national identity, but provides for mechanisms of inte-
gration of waves of immigrant populations. Even in the best of 
circumstances, the process of integration and the corresponding 
accommodation of prior governing values will take time. What 
hopefully ends up a richer cultural environment (oftentimes with 
side improvements from food to music) invariably begins as a pro-
ject of social and linguistic strain. 
Taking the United States as the key example, Figure 1 shows 
that there is no escaping the fact that immigration has risen dra-
matically in the past quarter century and that the level of foreign-
born Americans is at its highest in a century—precisely the time 
of the last great burst of nativist populism in the United States. 
 
 82 See Robert D. Putnam, E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-
First Century, 30 Scandinavian Polit Stud 137, 141–54 (2007) (discussing the relationship 
between diversity—and, by extension, immigration—and social isolation in American 
communities). See also Dora L. Costa and Matthew E. Kahn, Civic Engagement and Com-
munity Heterogeneity: An Economist’s Perspective, 1 Persp Polit 103, 105–07 (2003) (chart-
ing heterogeneity and voluntary civic participation in twentieth-century America). 
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FIGURE 1. NUMBER OF IMMIGRANTS AND THEIR SHARE OF THE 
TOTAL US POPULATION, 1850–201583 
What is striking here, apart from any concerns about the dis-
tribution of immigrant labor skill levels, or even the number of 
legal versus illegal immigrants, is just the sheer number. The last 
immigration-fueled nativist turn transformed American politics 
for a generation, including closed-border constraints on immigra-
tion, isolationist politics, and even Prohibition directed at the 
drinking habits of recent immigrants. 
The challenge of immigration emerges politically in tandem 
with the sense of loss in the economic sphere. In what is referred 
to as the “elephant curve,” produced by the World Bank and re-
produced in Figure 2 below, there is a graphic depiction of a global 
redirection of wealth over the twenty-year period leading into the 
 
 83 US Immigrant Population and Share over Time, 1850–Present (Migration Policy 
Inst), archived at http://perma.cc/3Q6T-6AY8. 
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financial meltdown, perhaps as significant as any ever recorded.84 
The graph shows a stunning rise in the real incomes of the great 
majority of the world’s population, with huge numbers being 
lifted from poverty—primarily, though not exclusively, the result 
of the Chinese economic transformation. 
FIGURE 2. GLOBAL INCOME GROWTH FROM 1988 TO 200885 
 With the exception of the very poorest of the poor, the past 
thirty years have witnessed a transformation of lives around the 
world from extreme poverty to levels of income, health, material 
possessions, and life prospects that begin to challenge those of the 
advanced industrial democracies. The graph further reflects the 
rise of finance and the dominance of the top 1 percent, a subject 
of democratic challenge for some form of equitable redistribution. 
But the most important part of this chart is the downward curve 
at which real levels of income variously increased at significantly 
lower rates, stagnated, or even decreased over the same twenty-
year period. This is the two deciles of the world’s population found 
 
 84 See Branko Milanovic, Global Income Inequality by the Numbers: In History and 
Now *7–8 (World Bank 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/Q3U3-5EL8 (comparing differ-
ent measures of global inequality and concluding that the period of globalization running 
from 1988 to 2008 witnessed “a decline in global inequality” for “perhaps [ ] the first time 
since the Industrial Revolution”). 
 85 Id. 
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at roughly the 65th to 85th percentiles of world income distribu-
tion. That group is roughly the working classes and lower middle 
classes of the advanced industrial countries that form the longest-
standing core of democratic societies. 
As a normative matter, redistribution from wealthier nations 
to poorer ones in a period of rising wealth must be applauded. The 
economic dislocations in the advanced industrial countries trans-
late on the ground into hundreds and hundreds of millions of peo-
ple being lifted from truly destitute conditions. But the global pro-
cesses that have done much to alleviate human suffering do not 
dampen the consequences of the inability of the advanced socie-
ties to cushion the domestic effects of international migration and 
global economic integration or to redistribute internally from the 
winners to the losers of globalization. 
The democratic sense of solidarity comes under siege as the 
laboring backbones of the advanced industrial countries find 
themselves challenged by a lost sense of recognizing their country 
amid rapidly changing demographics. It also comes as the rest of 
the world is exerting downward pressures on their living stand-
ards and as wealth shifts markedly to other parts of the world. 
As voters, these threatened groups in advanced societies were the 
backbone of the major parties of twentieth-century democracy—
the labor and social-democratic parties on the left, and the 
Christian democratic and center parties on the right. 
Both labor and the center-right parties were traditionally 
cautious to be negative on immigration and cross-border trade.86 
While their policies differed, each saw a central part of its political 
role as protecting the always vulnerable working class and small 
entrepreneurial class, including the highly subsidized agricul-
tural classes in countries like France, from economic dislocation. 
Both immigrants and the entry of cheaper goods from abroad 
threatened the less dynamic sectors of the advanced world econo-
mies. This is especially true for the working classes. Private-sector 
labor unions saw immigration as a source of downward pressure 
 
 86 This tradition is clearest in the breach. See Thomas R. Rochon and Ravi Roy, Ad-
aptation of the American Democratic Party in an Era of Globalization, 31 Intl J Polit Econ-
omy 12, 18–24 (Fall 2001) (documenting the Democrats’ shift from a primarily working-
class to middle-class party and the ensuing changes in trade policy in the 1990s). Thus 
NAFTA was pitched by not only the Reagan and Bush administrations, but by the Clinton 
administration as protecting not only jobs but ensuring popular demand for accessible 
consumer goods. See Michael Wilson, The North American Free Trade Agreement: Ronald 
Reagan’s Vision Realized (Heritage Foundation, Nov 23, 1993), archived at 
http://perma.cc/6Q46-LFN5. 
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on wages and resisted it as such. By contrast, public-sector unions 
primarily attend to the level of government expenditures on em-
ployment and tend to be neither protectionist on trade nor cau-
tious on immigration.87 When we look to the upper Midwest voting 
for President Trump, the decayed industrial north of England vot-
ing for Brexit, or the frayed industrial towns of northern France 
voting for the National Front, the message of governmental fail-
ure to provide for basic social security rings loudly. And, when 
coupled with the sense of the traditional institutions being disen-
gaged from working class concerns, the field is left open to popu-
list anger, whether from the right or left. 
Indeed, the message resonates in those communities feeling 
left behind. One simple measure in the United States is to break 
down the vote by county, the basic unit of local governance. Trump 
won roughly five times as many counties as Hillary Clinton, but 
the counties that Clinton won included almost all the largest and 
most dynamic urban areas of the country—indeed, although a nu-
merical minority, the counties won by Clinton generated 64 per-
cent of the national gross domestic product.88 In Britain, the 
same pattern obtained in the Brexit vote. Leaving aside Scotland 
and the eastern precincts of Northern Ireland (where voters 
were probably more inclined to leave the United Kingdom than 
the European Union), the Brexit vote matched the economic pro-
spects of the local populations. Brexit lost in London and the rel-
atively prosperous South, and carried most of the rest of the coun-
try, save for a few areas of economic resurrection in Manchester 
and Liverpool.89 Put another way, Brexit was the dominant choice 
of those over forty, the generations that had felt declining wage 
 
 87 See, for example, Alana Semuels, Why Are Unions So Worried about an Upcoming 
Supreme Court Case? (The Atlantic, Jan 8, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/AQU2-EQHG 
(noting the argument that a change to public-sector unions’ fee structures would pressure 
them to take more “hardline negotiating positions” on issues like salaries in order to prove 
their worth to employees). 
 88 See Mark Muro and Sifan Liu, Another Clinton-Trump Divide: High-Output America 
vs Low-Output America (Brookings, Nov 29, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/63QB-BS4J; 
Jim Tankersley, Donald Trump Lost Most of the American Economy in This Election 
(Wash Post, Nov 22, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/3U86-WRUD. 
 89 See EU Referendum: The Result in Maps and Charts (BBC, June 24, 2016), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/4JN2-55SM. 
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prospects, but not the generation under forty.90 Comparable dis-
tributions could be found in the French presidential elections, as 
well.91 
The groups threatened by declining economic prospects, a 
sense of isolation in their own countries, and the combined effects 
of foreign threat delivered Brexit and Trump’s victories in the up-
per Midwest. Now feeling vulnerable, these voters are increas-
ingly deserting their former political affiliations in favor of angry 
populist reactions, frequently led by demagogic appeals to isolation 
and the sense of lost horizons. From Brexit to Italy’s Five Star 
Movement to Trump to the National Front to Spain’s Podemos, the 
trends are dramatic. The historic array of postwar political par-
ties offered neither economic security nor a sense of political pro-
tection from outsiders, and were displaced by those much closer 
to the sense of populist dismay. 
In particular, the financial crisis of 2008 appears to have been 
the defining blow that exposed the frailty of democracies. The 
sudden economic dislocation stressed the already weak political 
institutions of governance and the ability of traditional political 
parties to offer prospects of remediation.92 For the laboring classes 
of the advanced democracies, for whom the decades leading to 
2008 had often offered a steady decline in relative real-wage 
growth, confidence in any remnant of the political status quo to 
cushion the further postcrisis economic decline was exceedingly 
low.93 Without functioning politics, democracies are ill prepared 
 
 90 See id. 
 91 While President Emmanuel Macron bested Marine Le Pen in all but two depart-
ments during the final round of voting, Le Pen’s support was strongest in the rural, dein-
dustrialized northeast and the southern coast. French Presidential Election May 2017—
Full Second Round Results and Analysis (The Guardian, May 26, 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/6VKE-8BPS. 
 92 See Steven Mufson, Why Obama Says Bank Reform Is a Success but Bernie Sanders 
Says It’s a Failure (Wash Post Wonkblog, Mar 7, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/6N6T-
9BSN (discussing internecine debates surrounding the failure to prosecute bankers and 
break up banks postcrisis). See also Justin Fox, What We’ve Learned from the Financial 
Crisis (Harvard Business Review, Nov 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/9L4E-TP4L (not-
ing how “unanimity [of opinion on macroeconomic policy] quickly unraveled” among econ-
omists after the 2008 financial bailout). 
 93 For an exploration of the postcrisis class rift on the American right, see 
Vanessa Williamson, Theda Skocpol, and John Coggin, The Tea Party and the Remak-
ing of Republican Conservatism, 9 Persp Polit 25, 32–34 (2011) (noting that Tea Party 
conservatives’ embrace of social-safety-net spending is at odds with Republican ortho-
doxy). See also David Frum, The Great Republican Revolt (The Atlantic, Jan–Feb 2016), 
archived at http://perma.cc/Y2CD-TBDZ (tracking the class divide in the Republican Party 
through Trump support in the 2016 primary). 
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to offer security, redistribution, or optimism about life prospects 
for their citizens. That huge numbers of the populations of the 
democratic countries no longer trusted in the solidaristic commit-
ment of the society or its capacity to protect them fueled the cur-
rent populist backlash. 
IV.  GETTING IT DONE 
Democratically produced laws are legitimate and authorita-
tive because they are produced by a procedure with a tendency to 
make correct decisions. 
—David M. Estlund94 
Over the past two centuries, democracies have outfought, 
out-innovated, and outproduced their rivals. With singular capac-
ity, democracies raised the living standards of the broad masses 
of their populations, raised education levels to permit citizen en-
gagement, and at the same time were able to trust powerful mil-
itaries to protect them from foreign assault without succumbing 
to military rule. History is obviously much more complicated and 
this is a somewhat tendentious reading, but it captures the ideo-
logical consensus that prevailed after the collapse of the Soviet 
empire and the brief era of presumed democratic universalism. 
As Professor Branko Milanovic’s elephant curve chart on in-
come distribution95 shows, however, the optimistic story is under 
serious challenge. The China/Singapore models96 of authoritarian 
rule coupled with high state competence highlight an emerging 
feature of democracies: the presence of multiple veto points block-
ing the creation of public goods and equitable policies. Mature de-
mocracies include mechanisms of transparency, due process, and 
participation that provide an entry point for private interests to 
 
 94 David M. Estlund, Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework 8 
(Princeton 2008). 
 95 See note 84 and Figure 2. 
 96 In Singapore, initial firm state oversight of financial and labor markets coupled 
with aggressive solicitation of foreign investment achieved rapid growth in the decades 
following independence. See generally W.G. Huff, What Is the Singapore Model of Eco-
nomic Development?, 19 Camb J Econ 735 (1995). While China’s general rise is well 
known, less focus has been placed on its advances in infrastructure. It has spent 8.5 per-
cent of its GDP since the 1990s on infrastructure, and now outpaces both the United States 
and the European Union in absolute spending. While gains are lopsided by sector, it has 
rapidly built its infrastructure stock to compete with developed nations. See Yougang 
Chen, Stefan Matzinger, and Jonathan Woetzel, Chinese Infrastructure: The Big Picture 
(McKinsey Q, June 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/3U7V-2SF7. 
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block undesired governmental action.97 Under such circum-
stances, it is easier to block than to build and the result is to raise 
the costs of public endeavors dramatically. Fukuyama terms this 
the rise of “vetocracy,” defined as “a situation in which special in-
terests can veto measures harmful to themselves, while collective 
action for the common good becomes exceedingly difficult to 
achieve. Vetocracy isn’t fatal to American democracy, but it does 
produce poor governance.”98 Easy confirmation can be found in the 
wobbly efforts of the Republicans in the US Congress to pass from 
a party of opposition to a party of governance on their signature 
demand for the repeal of the Affordable Care Act.99 After seven 
years of campaigning on a promise to repeal Obamacare, a clear 
Republican majority in the House of Representatives had trouble 
even proposing legislation to be submitted to a congressional 
vote.100 
The central claim to superior competence of democracies is 
not the process of governance but the outputs that result; delib-
eration is necessarily slower and more complicated than decree. 
At some point, however, deliberation is not a process of citizen 
inputs but a public-choice nightmare in which vested sectional in-
terests can marshal resources to overwhelm the passive majority. 
The result is a failure of public policy leadership and a collapse 
into rewards for privileged access to the strongest forces in gov-
ernment, almost invariably the executive. As I have described the 
process elsewhere, “the ‘three C’s’ of consolidated power take hold: 
clientelism, cronyism, and corruption.”101 The result is “weak de-
mocracies with autocratically minded leaders, who govern 
through informal, patronage networks . . . . [C]lientelism binds 
many citizens to ruling elites through cooptation and coercion.”102 
Such failing democracies have no necessary organizational supe-
riority to more decisive regimes, and indeed the presence of nu-
merous veto points to action may actually make democracies less 
capable. 
 
 97 See Francis Fukuyama, The Failed State, Prospect 30, 31 (Jan 2017). 
 98 Id at 31. 
 99 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub L No 111-148, 124 Stat 119 (2010). 
 100 See Alexander Bolton, GOP Facing Likely Failure on ObamaCare Repeal (The 
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Consider an example from major new airport construction, a 
massively complex undertaking that has not even been attempted 
in the United States since the opening of the Denver airport in 
1995. An international traveler to Beijing cannot help but be 
awed by the majestic beauty of the Terminal 3 international arri-
vals. Built for the opening of the Beijing Olympics, and designed 
by English architect Norman Foster, its dramatic arches evoke 
both the red lacquer motifs of Imperial China and the bird’s nest 
design of the Olympic stadium. The new terminal was con-
structed, from design to completion, in four years, a massive effort 
that included three work crews a day, laboring on rotating eight-
hour shifts.103 
By contrast, compare Terminal 3 with Heathrow’s Terminal 5 
in London. Like Terminal 3 in Beijing, Heathrow’s Terminal 5 is 
designed by Norman Foster. Yet it is at best functional, a desper-
ately needed additional space for an overcrowded airport. It has 
no grandeur, no inspiration, no sense of tribute to a rising 
power—and it took twenty years to complete. 
When pressed about this in a BBC interview, Foster acknowl-
edged the gains in completion time in China from more efficient 
labor use, lower regulatory demands, ease of siting, and a host of 
other factors. But even on Foster’s account, there were years of 
delay that could not be accounted for. Instead what emerges is the 
capacity of Chinese authorities to simply get the job done: 
“[Y]ou’ve taken out the democratic process, you’ve taken out the 
plan, so that comes down to decision making, it comes down to 
having a very, very clear idea of objectives and getting on with 
it.”104 At the end of the day, the capacity to produce turned on the 
difficulties of democracy, an observation that challenges demo-
cratic claims of superior capacity. Thus, Foster contrasts the 
British perspective—“[O]h well, it took a long time but we are a 
democratic society”—with the societal “hung[er] for change and 
[ ] for progress” driving rapid production in China.105 
Of course, my home airport in New York is LaGuardia, which 
makes Terminal 5 look like paradise. Among New York’s signa-
ture contributions to democratic dysfunction is the much bally-
hooed opening of the Second Avenue subway extension in 2017, a 
mere eighty-eight years after it was initially proposed. Even more 
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striking than the delay were the extravagant costs, themselves a 
self-imposed problem of poor governance. Digging a subway in a 
dense urban environment necessitates disrupting delivery of gas, 
water, telecommunications, and so forth. Doing so efficiently in 
turn requires coordination so that service disruptions and alter-
native sources can be adjusted. The builder of the subway found 
coordination among the various utilities and regulatory agencies 
that covered each service so daunting that it decided the only so-
lution was to dig deep into the bedrock of Manhattan so as to 
avoid having any contact with any other utilities or administra-
tors.106 The result is that more than eighty years after first pro-
posed, the Second Avenue subway finally opened in 2017, encom-
passing a total of four subway stops, running a grand total of 
about three kilometers, and pricing in at a whopping figure of al-
most $2 billion per kilometer.107 
The capacity to cushion the dislocations of the modern global 
economy and the press of immigration is another measure of state 
competence. Germany’s capacity to integrate the former East 
Germany confirms the difficulty of the enterprise, even among 
people who already shared a language and a clear national iden-
tity. It is here that all the themes of democratic stress come to-
gether. The inability of institutional political actors to debate pol-
icy, to appeal to collective interest, and to assure through 
competent leadership all drain the vitality of the democratic pro-
ject. Populist anger is stoked by state incompetence and increased 
clientelism for those with privileged access to the executive. 
Weakened forms of participation and deliberation, in turn, com-
pound the sense of democratic failure. 
CONCLUSION 
The picture of democracy presented here is certainly somber, 
but it need not be funereal. The identified deficits in democratic 
governance are serious, no doubt. But the advanced industrial de-
mocracies are sophisticated societies with great internal re-
sources. Three are worth noting here because they are significant 
sources of resilience. Undoubtedly there are many more, but these 
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three flow immediately from the discussion above, and the last 
points back to the rule of law, a topic thus far not addressed. 
First, waves of populist anger tend to be conjunctural. The 
immediate spark for the latest political tide appears to be the con-
sequences of the financial crisis of 2008. Economic recovery is the 
likeliest source of any easing of enraged politics. But populist re-
action translates poorly into governance, as the US Republican 
Party has shown in its hesitating transition from opposition to 
ruling. The current populist wave began at least a decade earlier 
in Latin America than in Europe or the United States, and it is 
now sputtering out amid corruption scandals and the inability to 
achieve deliverance. 
Second, democratic states abound in civil-society institutions 
that resist the anti-liberalism of caudillo politics. One of the main 
failings of the Founding constitutional vision in the United States 
was the lack of any space for intermediating institutions that 
stood between the state and the citizenry. Tocqueville’s observa-
tions about the notable abundance of association in the young 
Republic may be generalized to all democratic countries, includ-
ing the more state-oriented political orders of Europe. Even a 
strict Montesquieu-inspired division of government powers 
proved not to anticipate the manner in which democratic societies 
function. From the press to community associations to political 
parties to churches there is far more resilience than just a formal 
account of the separation of powers between the legislature and 
the executive. 
Third, democratic societies develop thick legal institutions 
bounded by the rule of law. Moments of populist passion confront 
constitutional constraints and the restraining force of constitu-
tional courts, as I addressed at length in Fragile Democracies.108 
The Brexit vote provides a useful illustration. Although advocacy 
for popular initiatives in Britain has a long history, going back at 
least to Professor A.V. Dicey more than a century ago,109 the pro-
cess is relatively unutilized and the relation between the subjects 
of referendum and ensuing governmental action remains unclear. 
As the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution con-
cluded, “[W]e regret the ad hoc manner in which referendums 
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have been used, often as a tactical device, by the government of 
the day.”110 
In the aftermath of Brexit, Prime Minister Cameron departed 
the scene and a chastened Tory government formed under Prime 
Minister Theresa May, itself further weakened by a disastrous 
gamble on rapid-fire elections. The government allowed the 
Brexit vote to stand as the will of the people and took the first 
steps toward unwinding Britain’s participation in the European 
Union. This provoked a legal challenge leading to a remarkable 
discussion in the UK Supreme Court on the nature of British 
democratic governance. In an approach that hearkens back to 
Justice Jackson’s careful dissection of the delicate balance of pow-
ers between the executive and the legislature, the Court framed 
the inquiry: “[The] Act envisages domestic law, and therefore 
rights of UK citizens, changing as EU law varies, but it does not 
envisage those rights changing as a result of ministers unilater-
ally deciding that the United Kingdom should withdraw from the 
EU Treaties.”111 
That a weak government had appealed directly over the head 
of Parliament to enraged voters did not alter the institutional 
commitments to the democratic supremacy of Parliament. Nor 
could the prime minister invoke plebiscitary approval as a substi-
tute for proper institutional process: 
The question is whether that domestic starting point, intro-
duced by Parliament, can be set aside, or could have been in-
tended to be set aside, by a decision of the UK executive with-
out express Parliamentary authorisation. We cannot accept 
that a major change to UK constitutional arrangements can 
be achieved by ministers alone; it must be effected in the only 
way that the UK constitution recognises, namely by Parlia-
mentary legislation. This conclusion appears to us to follow 
from the ordinary application of basic concepts of constitu-
tional law to the present issue.112 
Rule-of-law principles may not serve to brake the more wor-
risome manifestations of populist anger. In some countries, as in 
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Hungary and increasingly in Poland, the institutions may be 
overwhelmed by the concerted forces of politics. But they can pro-
vide a necessary challenge and an avenue of repair. In the words 
of the US court confronting the Trump administration’s proposed 
travel bans and the administration’s claims to unaccountable ex-
ecutive discretion: 
There is no precedent to support this claimed unreviewabil-
ity, which runs contrary to the fundamental structure of our 
constitutional democracy. 
. . . 
[Our cases] make clear, courts can and do review constitu-
tional challenges to the substance and implementation of im-
migration policy. 
. . . 
[T]he Government’s “authority and expertise in [such] mat-
ters do not automatically trump the Court’s own obligation to 
secure the protection that the Constitution grants to individ-
uals,” even in times of war.113 
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